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GARY L. BELL, UBN 6485 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
124 South 400 East, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone? (801) 532-0827 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940394-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CHARLES B. BUGGER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant brings this appeal from the decision of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) 
(1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err, as a matter of Law, in entering 
the June 1994 Decree of Annulment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law "Nunc Pro Tunc"? (R 133-36) 
Determining whether the doctrine of Nunc Pro Tunc was properly 
applied is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Matter of Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Did the lower court err, as a matter of Law, in setting 
aside Appellant's Amended Decree of Annulment, entered on or about 
July 22, 1993? (R 181-86) 
Issues of Law are subject to de novo review by a 
appellate court, and the court gives no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law* Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State. 779 
P*2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
3. Did the lower court err, as a factual finding, in 
concluding there was "good cause" for a Decree of Annulment to be 
entered Nunc Pro Tunc in this matter? (R 133-36) 
4. Did the lower court err, as a factual finding, in 
concluding the Respondent did not intentionally and willfully 
disregard Judge Conder's ruling in the 1983 proceedings? (R 239-42) 
A finding of fact will be adjudged clearly erroneous if 
it violates appellate court standards, is inconsistent with the 
clear weight of the evidence, or, the reviewing court is "left with 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed" 
even though there is evidence to support the finding. Cumminas v. 
Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). Issues of fact may be 
reversed on appeal if they are found to be clearly erroneous. 
Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provision is controlling in this 
action: 
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Utah Code Ann. S 30-4a-l (1983) 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good 
cause and giving of such notice as may he ordered, enter an 
order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to marriage , divorce , 
legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the case. 
This appeal is from entry of a domestic relations ORDER 
PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND RELATED RELIEF AND 
DISCHARGE OF LIEN CLAIM, and the corresponding DECREE OF ANNULMENT 
(ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC), entered by the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
Judge for Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
(b) Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
In January of 1946, Respondent, Wilma R. Bugger (hereinafter 
"Wilma"), was awarded a Decree of Divorce that was to become 
absolute and final in July of 1946. However, in June of 1946, 
Wilma married Appellant, Charles B. Bugger (hereinafter "Charles"), 
in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
On or about the 13th day of May, 1982, Wilma was awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from Charles, by default, from the Third Judicial 
District Court. Charles subsequently filed a Motion to Set Aside 
the default Decree. 
On the 19th day of April, 1983, following a hearing on 
Charles' motion and his proposed Counterclaim for Annulment, the 
previous Decree of Divorce was set aside and the parties were 
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awarded a Decree of Annulment, to become final upon entry by the 
Court. Although Wilma's counsel was obliged to draft the 
documents, the final Decree of Annulment and accompanying Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were never provided for entry by the 
court. 
On or about April 13, 1993, the parties' final Decree of 
Annulment was ultimately entered, along with the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, all of which had been prepared from the 
transcript of the April 19, 1983, hearing. On or about July 22, 
1993, these documents were Amended to include a legal description 
of the real property involved in the matter but were otherwise 
unchanged from the April 1993 documents. 
Subsequent to entry of the Amended Decree of Annulment in July 
of 1993, an Order to Show Cause action against was filed, which was 
followed by a counter-motion to set aside the Amended Decree of 
Annulment. On the 1st day of March, 1994, the matter was certified 
for a hearing in front of a District Court Judge. 
On the 19th day of April, 1994, the 1993 Decree(s) of 
Annulment, the Findings of Fact, and the Conclusions of Law were 
set aside. Wilma's counsel was again ordered to prepare a new 
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, which were to be based upon the transcript of the 1983 hearing 
and were to be entered Nunc Pro Tunc. 
On or about the 3rd day of June, 1994, Wilma's version of the 
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
4 
were entered Nunc Pro Tunc, even though these documents did not 
conform to the transcript of the 1983 ruling. Charles timely filed 
his appeal on this matter on or about the 30th day of June, 1994. 
(c) Statement of Material Facts. 
On or about January 21, 1946, Wilma was granted a divorce from 
a prior husband, with the provision that this Decree of Divorce 
would not become absolute and final until the expiration of six (6) 
months from the date the Decree was entered, roughly July 21, 1946. 
Notwithstanding Wilma* s knowledge of the continuing validity of her 
marriage to her former husband, on or about June 10, 1946, and 
without Charles' knowledge of the divorce provision, Wilma entered 
into a marriage relationship with Charles. 
In or around October of 1981, Wilma filed a divorce action 
against Charles, which was granted in May of 1982 by way of the 
court's entry of Charles' default. It was during the course of 
these proceedings that Charles learned that Wilma's prior marriage 
had not been legally dissolved prior to her marriage to Charles and 
a Motion to Set Aside the Default and proposed counterclaim for 
annulment was filed. 
On April 19th of 1983, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District 
Court Judge, presided over a hearing on the matter. At the close 
of this hearing, Judge Conder entered his oral findings for the 
record wherein he stated the Decree would be final upon his 
signature and entry by the court. In order to achieve an equitable 
property distribution in this complex situation, Judge Conder 
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basically took the position that he would do the best he could 
under the circumstances• 
Wilma was awarded the marital residence, with the direction 
that upon Judge Conder's signing of the final Decree of Annulment, 
Wilma had six (6) months to pay Charles $9,826-00, the balance of 
his equity in the property distribution scheme. Among the other 
provisions of Judge Conder's oral ruling was an award of a mobile 
home to Charles, which Judge Conder valued at $7,000.00 for equity 
distribution purposes (Wilma herself had described the same mobile 
home as "very old" in financial declarations filed in both 1982 and 
1983). Charles was also awarded a $79.11 per month equity 
payment on a uniform real estate contract that had roughly nine 
more years to run. 
Wilma•s counsel failed to submit the final Decree of Annulment 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Charles' approval 
and entry by the Court upon Judge Conder's signature. However, 
pursuant to the 1983 ruling, Wilma made the monthly payments on the 
uniform real estate contract, until it ran out in roughly April of 
1992, but Wilma never did pay Charles the $9,826.00 she was ordered 
to pay for the balance of his equity interest in the marital 
property. Of course, Wilma's attorney never did submit the final 
Decree of Annulment for Judge Conder's signature so as to start the 
six month time frame from which Wilma*s payment obligation would 
start to run, so it appeared there was no legal obligation for 
Wilma to make this payment. 
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In or around the summer of 1992, Charles learned that Wilma 
had sold the very mobile home that had been awarded to Charles in 
1983. Wilma had neither the authority nor the consent to sell the 
mobile home, but she sold it nonetheless for approximately $500.00. 
Upon learning of WilmaBs unauthorized disposal of Charles' 
property, Charles sought the advice of an attorney who ultimately 
discovered that there had never been a Decree of Annulment entered 
by the court* 
Following the attorney's direction, Charles tracked down the 
Court Reporter that worked with Judge Conder in 1983 and had Judge 
Conder's oral rulings transcribed. Charles then retained the 
services of Loreen Poff to assist in generating, from the 
transcript, the Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
In April of 1993, without the assistance of counsel, Charles 
submitted the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the final Decree of Annulment to Judge Medley, along with a 
photocopy of the transcripts upon which the documents were based. 
Judge Medley reviewed the transcript and determined the documents 
were consistent with Judge Conder's rulings and Judge Medley 
therefore signed the documents and they were entered by the court. 
During this time period, Wilma was serving a mission for the 
L.D.S. church; she was not present in the State of Utah; and Wilma 
did not receive advance notice of Charles* Pro Se and ex-parte 
filings. Shortly after the court entered the Decree of Annulment, 
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in July of 1993 and still during Wilma*s service for her churchf 
Charles learned it was appropriate to include a legal description 
of real property in marriage dissolution documents so, still 
without the services of counsel and without notice to Wilma, 
Charles had the documents amended to include the legal description 
of the real property involved. Judge Medley again reviewed the 
documents and, determining that the legal description amendment did 
not change the substance of Judge Conder's 1983 ruling, Judge 
Medley signed and entered the Amended documents on July 22, 1993. 
Following Wilma*s return to the State of Utah, sometime around 
August of 1993, Charles filed a pro se Order to Show Cause against 
Wilma regarding her failure to pay Charles the equity he had been 
awarded in 1983 and Wilma8s unauthorized and unilateral sale of his 
property, the mobile home. Charles prosecuted his Order to Show 
Cause pro se until Commissioner Atherton of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered her recommendation against Charles on or 
about the 1st day of March, 1994, and certified the matter for a 
hearing in front of Judge Medley. At that point in time, Charles 
again sought the assistance of counsel. 
On the 19th day of April, 1994, the matter came back before 
Judge Medley on Charles' Order to Show Cause and on Wilma's Motion 
for Relief from the Orders of the Court. During this hearing, 
Judge Medley ruled (1) the final Decree of Annulment, Findings of 
Fact, and the Conclusions of Law were never entered by Judge Conder 
in 1983 or at any time thereafter; (2) that even though Judge 
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Medley personally reviewed the transcript and verified it was 
consistent with Charles1 proposed documents, Judge Medley set aside 
the Amended Decree of Annulment for lack of "notice" to Wilma; (3) 
there was no willful disregard for Judge Conder's 1983 rulings; (4) 
each party was now precluded from remedy by reason of laches, 
inasmuch as the Decree was to be entered nunc pro tunc; (5) and 
Charles was ordered to remove his lien upon the residential 
property of Wilma in light of the no remedy ruling. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, it is entirely inappropriate for a trial court 
to enter an Order nunc pro tunc when the delay in rendering the 
final Decree or Judgment is based upon the negligence or failure of 
one of the parties to the action. Nunc pro tunc Orders are 
appropriate only when it is established that the delay was caused 
by circumstances and/or events entirely beyond the control of the 
parties to the action• 
In the present case, the delay in entering the final Decree 
was directly caused by the failure of a party to follow through 
with their obligation - the final Decree was simply never submitted 
to the court. Therefore, a Decree of Annulment entered Nunc Pro 
Tunc in the present case was plain error and should be set aside. 
Also, the lower court's determination that there was no 
willful disregard of Judge Conder's 1983 ruling was clearly 
erroneous when the record shows Wilma clearly knew she was 
obligated to pay Charles $9,826.00 within six months of the 
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Annulment or put the marital residence up for sale* Charles did 
not receive the $9,826.00 and the home was never placed on the 
market for sale. This is clear evidence of willful and knowing 
disregard for the orders of the court. 
An additional err occurred when the lower court set aside the 
July 1993 Amended Decree of Annulment, based upon the court's 
conclusion that Wilma did not receive her constitutional or 
statutory right to "notice" before the Decree was entered. 
Inasmuch as the Amended Decree of Annulment entered in July of 1993 
was prepared directly from the transcript of Judge Conder's oral 
rulings in 1983, Wilma had already received full, complete, and 
actual "notice" of the contents of the final Decree of Annulment 
when she voluntarily participated in the 1983 proceedings. 
Finally, it is equally obvious that the 1994 documents entered 
by the lower court, nunc pro tunc, were not based upon the 
transcript of Judge Conder's ruling, as was ordered by Judge Medley 
in April of 1994. The 1994 Decree of Annulment and the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law are clearly taken from the documents 
that were alleged to have been generated by Wilma's counsel in 
1983. The 1994 documents contain several findings and conclusions 
that appear nowhere within the transcript, not to mention wording 
that is inconsistent with the transcript but almost identical to 
the language found in the alleged 1983 documents. Judge Medley 
ordered that documents be prepared consistent with the transcript; 
Judge Medley did not recognize the validity of the alleged 1983 
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documentation; it is therefore plain error for the lower court to 
have accepted and entered documentation inconsistent with that 
which was ordered and the 1994 nunc pro tunc Decree and 
accompanying documentation should therefore be set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MISUSED ITS NUNC PRO TUNC POWER WHEN IT 
APPLIED THIS PROCESS TO THE JUNE 1994 DECREE OF ANNULMENT. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1994), the trial court 
may enter an Order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to the 
annulment of marriage IF the court finds "good cause" for such an 
entry. The definition and/or meaning of "good cause" hinges upon 
the particular facts of a case and therefore "must be determined on 
a case by case basis . . •" Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 
(Utah App. 1987). Additionally, the legislative foundation of the 
nunc pro tunc power was to at least attempt to avoid "obvious 
injustices" that would result without such authority. Id. The 
facts involved in the present case are inconsistent with the 
position that there is "good cause" for use of the nunc pro tunc 
power or that "obvious injustices" would result if the power were 
not applied. 
A. There Simply Is Not Enough Legal Or Factual Support In 
This Case To Establish "Good Cause" For Use Of The Lower 
Court's Nunc Pro Tunc Power. 
Generally speaking, courts applying the nunc pro tunc power 
have been upheld on appeal under circumstances where one of the 
parties to the action has died after the matter was submitted to 
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the court for a decision, but prior to the court actually rendering 
its decision, or, when a decision has actually been rendered by the 
court but through no fault of the parties, the court itself has 
failed to properly record the decision. See, e.g», Baashaw v. 
Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990). 
Neither of the parties in the present case have died, which 
leaves the second category as the generally accepted grounds for 
use of the nunc pro tunc power. Quoting from Mitchell v. Overman, 
103 U.S. 62, 26 L.Ede 369 (1881), this Court stated as follows: 
The second category is based upon the principle that "where 
the delay in rendering judgment or decree arises from the 
act of the court, that is, where the delay has been for its 
convenience, or has been caused by the multiplicity or 
press of business or the intricacy of the questions 
involved, or of any other cause not attributable to the 
laches of the parties, but within the control of the court; 
the judgment or the decree may be entered retrospectively." 
Baashaw, 788 P.2d at 1060-61. (Emphasis in original). In 
reviewing the facts of its case, the Baashaw Court commented 
These general principles of the common law of nunc pro tunc 
are relevant, if not controlling, in a determination of good 
cause under section 30-4a-l. In this case, the court did not 
make the clerical error, but taking the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Husband, Husband did. It is undisputed 
that the court never received the written stipulation 
mentioned in the minute entry. Thus, this alone could support 
a finding of lack of "good cause" under section 30-4a-l. 
788 P.2d at 1061. 
As in the Baashaw case, the 1983 court in the present case did 
not make any clerical errors, but taking the facts in the light 
most favorable to Wilma, Wilma did. It was Wilma's responsibility, 
through counsel, to draft the Decree of Annulment, get it approved 
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as to form, signed by Judge Conder and ultimately entered by the 
court. It is undisputed that Judge Conder never signed the final 
Decree of Annulment because it was never submitted for his review. 
Just as was found in the Bagshaw case, this alone could support a 
finding of lack of "good cause" under section 30-4a-l. Whether 
viewed as a factual matter or an issue of law, there is no "good 
cause" support for the nunc pro tunc ruling and it should be set 
aside. 
B* Even Assuming "Good Cause" Is Supportable In The Present Case, 
The June 1994 Decree And The Accompanying Documents Were Not 
Consistent With The Only Actual Record Of The 1983 Ruling And 
Therefore The 1994 Documentation Does Not Meet The Nunc Pro 
Tunc Requirements. 
In Preece v. Preece, the Utah Supreme Court stated "the 
function of a nunc pro tunc order is not to make an order now for 
then, but to enter now for then an order previously made." 682 P.2d 
298, 299 (Utah 1984). The Court further stated that "nunc pro tunc 
is used to make the record speak the truth; it may not be used to 
correct the court's failure to speak." Id. 
In the present case, the only absolute record available which 
reveals what was actually ordered by Judge Conder in 1983 is the 
transcript, which is the best possible source of information 
available. Unfortunately, the Decree of Annulment entered nunc pro 
tunc in June of 1994, as well as the documents accompanying the 
Decree, reveals several serious inconsistencies when compared to 
the transcript; although the 1994 documents are extremely 
consistent with the documentation allegedly prepared in 1983 by 
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Wilma's prior legal representative. 
In light of the fact that Wilma's counsel was ordered in 1994 
to prepare a Decree, Findings, and Conclusions that were consistent 
with the transcript, and inasmuch as the final product was an 
obvious disregard for that order and clearly covers issues and 
matters found nowhere within the transcript, the 1994 Decree of 
Annulment, entered nunc pro tunc, was plain and clear error. A 
document that does not reflect the actual order previously entered 
does not satisfy the requirements for use of the nunc pro tunc 
power. By using the power inappropriately, as in the present case, 
the very injustice that the power was meant to avoid was in fact 
generated. The 1994 documentation simply has no support under the 
nunc pro tunc criteria and, as a matter of law, the nunc pro tunc 
ruling should be set aside. 
C. "Good Cause" Determinations Must Include A Consideration 
Of Good Faith Dealings And Wilma Knowingly And Willfully 
Disregarded Judge Conder's 1983 Orders Regarding The 
Property Distribution And Equity Equalization. 
In defining "good cause" for nunc pro tunc purposes, it is 
important for the court to consider all factors that relate to 
methods of avoiding "obvious injustices" that could result from the 
inappropriate use of the nunc pro tunc power. See, Home, 737 P.2d 
at 248. In the present case, Wilma's willful, knowing, and 
intentional disregard for Judge Conder's 1983 order shows conduct 
that would create an "obvious injustice" if she is allowed to avoid 
court ordered liability because of a failure on the part of her own 
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legal representative. Under the circumstances of this case, 
leaving the nunc pro tunc order in place presents just such an 
injustice* 
Wilma claims she received a copy of the Decree of Annulment 
from her attorney in 1983. The alleged Decree of Annulment clearly 
states Wilma was to pay Charles $9,000.00 plus within 180 days or 
she was ordered to place the home on the real estate market for 
immediate sale. Wilma also states that she assumed the Decree of 
Annulment had been signed and entered by the court; thus Wilma was 
under the impression that the Decree was a valid and legal order of 
the court. Assuming this to be true, Wilma's failure to pay 
Charles the $9,000.00 plus within six months of the 1983 hearing 
date, and her failure to place the house on the market for sale 
following that six month period, is clear and indisputable evidence 
of a willful and knowing disregard for Judge Conder's order. 
It would be entirely inappropriate and creates an obvious 
injustice if Wilma is now entitled to escape liability under Judge 
Conder's orders based on her own legal representative's failure to 
carry out his obligations and the nunc pro tunc orders now in 
place; especially in light of Wilma's admissions that she has 
already knowingly, intentionally, and wrongfully sold property that 
she knew was awarded to Charles in 1983. All documents filed in 
June of 1994, and entered nunc pro tunc, should be set aside as an 
abuse of discretion by the lower court and clearly inappropriate 
under the circumstances and undisputable facts of this case. 
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lie WILMA'S PERSONAL AND FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF JUDGE CONDER'S 
RULING IN 1983 CONSTITUTES "ACTUAL" NOTICE, THEREBY PRECLUDING 
WILMA'S CLAIMS OF DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS AND/OR PREJUDICE. 
The 14 th amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as 
Article I of the Utah Constitution, impose procedural due process 
restrictions on the power of government to proceed against 
individuals or their property. At the heart of the due process 
clause is the implicit guarantee that an individual has the right 
to have an opportunity to appear and defend against any action 
which may deprive the individual of property or liberty. In the 
case at hand, Wilma cannot make a valid Due Process argument. 
In Graham v. Sawaya, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the 
due process clause requires "notice to a party before his or her 
rights are affected by a judgment." 632 P.2d 851, 853 (1981). 
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness." Nelson 
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2nd. 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). The 1993 
proceedings for which Wilma complains of a lack of notice, thereby 
violating her Due Process rights, is not a new proceeding for 
judgment, nor an appeal of a proceeding's judgment, but was the 
mere filing of the documentation based upon and consistent with the 
transcripts of the original proceeding, which Wilma took part in. 
As a party to the original proceeding, Wilma received fair and 
sufficient notice, was given ample opportunity to be heard, and to 
prepare for the defense of her person, position and property. 
Wilma is therefore charged with "actual" notice of that 
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proceeding's judgment and there is no Due Process violation based 
upon the entry of that judgment without notice in 1993. 
As stated by the Court in Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., a 
"person is deemed to have 'constructive notice' when he is in 
possession of all the relevant facts and circumstances." 806 P.2d 
503, 508 (Mont. 1991). Wilma was not only a party in the original 
proceeding and therefore had "all the relevant facts and 
circumstances, " Wilma*s counsel was given the responsibility for 
drafting and filing the final Decree of Annulment, the Findings of 
Fact, and the Conclusions of Law. Wilma1 s counsel may have failed 
to file the documents with the court, but Wilma still had full 
knowledge of the contents of Judge Conder's ruling. Thus, Wilma 
was not deprived of her Due Process rights in 1993 on the grounds 
of inadequate notice when Judge Medley entered the Decree of 
Annulment consistent with the transcript of Judge Conder's ruling 
in 1983. The Amended Decree of Annulment entered in July of 1993 
should not have been set aside. 
While Charles has the burden of establishing Wilma's knowledge 
by clear and convincing evidence, such evidence is a matter of 
record in the present case. Thus, actual notice precludes Wilma 
from complaining of prejudice for failure to receive statutory 
notice. 
III. WITHOUT ESTABLISHING A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION, THE LOWER COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE THE 1993 AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT. 
Under The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "Findings of fact, 
17 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous . e ." Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are 
against the clear weight of evidence or if the court is convinced 
that a mistake has been made. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 
159 (Utah App. 1989). In order to successfully challenge a trial 
courtBs findings, all the relevant evidence presented at the 
proceeding must be marshalled and a demonstration made as to why 
the findings are clearly erroneous. Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 
P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1990). Therefore, unless Wilma can show that 
the Findings of Fact based upon the documentary evidence, the 
transcript, are clearly erroneous, there is simply no legal basis 
for setting aside the Findings and Decree entered in 1993. 
In addition, where the parties have been afforded a trial, the 
Court in Hall v. Blackman stated that a presumption arises that the 
judgment should not be disturbed unless the one attacking the 
judgment can meet the requirement of showing that the error is 
substantial and prejudicial. 417 P.2d 664 (Utah 1966). Under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 states that "The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties." In Workman v. Nagle Const. Co., this Court held that 
although the prevailing party may fail to notify the opponents of 
entry of judgment, this failure does not make the judgment 
ineffective, but is rather harmless error. 802 P.2d 749, 750 - 751 
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(Utah App. 1990). Therefore, until Wilma can show that the 
original judgment or the Findings of Fact based on the transcript 
of the original proceeding has substantial and prejudicial error, 
the judgments should not be disturbed or ruled as void. 
Absent the establishment of a Due Process claim, Charles 
should prevail on this appeal. Wilma, a party to the original 
judicial proceeding, is charged with knowledge of that proceeding 
and all ruling generated by that proceeding. Thus, since knowledge 
is held to be a form of actual notice, unless Wilma can provide a 
clear showing of substantial and prejudicial error, the Findings of 
Fact based on the original transcript of the judgment should not be 
set aside. Wilma simply cannot support her claim of prejudice for 
Charles' failure to provide notice in 1993. While Charles has the 
burden of establishing Wilma's knowledge by clear and convincing 
evidence, such evidence is a matter of record* Therefore, without 
a showing of harm, substantial and prejudicial error, or a due 
process violation, the lower court should not have set aside the 
1993 Decree of Annulment for failure to provide notice. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's power to enter orders nunc pro tunc is 
strictly regulated and reviewed under appellate standards that 
preclude its use in circumstances where the negligence of one of 
the parties to the action causes the delay in entering the judgment 
or Decree. It was Wilma's failure if it was anyone's that caused 
the delay in the entry of Judge Conder's ruling and therefore a 
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nunc pro tunc order is inappropriate and should be set aside. 
Also, nunc pro tunc orders are not appropriate when the 
judgment or Decree is not consistent with the actual orders of the 
previous court, nor is it appropriate when its application would 
cause the very injustices it was meant to avoid. In the present 
case, the nunc pro tunc orders discuss issues found not in the 
transcript but in the prior documents that were rejected by the 
court. Terminology used in the nunc pro tunc orders match the 
language used in the rejected documents, but are inconsistent with 
the transcript of the 1983 hearing. By allowing the nunc pro tunc 
order to stand, Wilma avoids any and all liability for failing to 
abide by the court's orders, which is an obvious injustice. 
Finally, the 1993 Decree and Findings were based upon, and 
totally consistent with, Judge Conder's actual orders in 1983. In 
light of the fact these documents were based upon indisputable 
documentary evidence, which Wilma had complete and actual knowledge 
of, Wilma had actual "notice" of the 1993 Decree and Findings. The 
1993 documents entered by Judge Medley should not have been set 
aside and in doing so, the lower court abused its discretion. 
Based on the foregoing facts and arguments, Charles 
respectfully asks this Court to overturn the trial court and set 
aside the 1994 Decree of Annulment (Entered Nunc Pro Tunc) and 
reinstate the Amended Decree of Annulment entered by the trial 
court in July of 1993. Further, in the interests of justice and 
fairness, Charles respectfully requests that this Court not 
20 
institute the six (6) month time period in which Wilma must pay 
Charles the balance of his equity distribution interest until such 
time as this Court announces its decision, notwithstanding the 
entry of the Decree in July of 1993. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7f#dav of March, 1995. 
GARY L. BELL 
124 South 400 East, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Charles B. Bugger 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT were hand-delivered or mailed, 
postage prepaid, to W. Kevin Jackson, Attorney for Respondent, at 
311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379, 
on this /7f# day of March, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM: 
TRANSCRIPT OF 1983 HEARING, JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER PRESIDING 
(Transcription date March 21, 1992) 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Entered July 22, 1993) 
AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT 
(Entered July 22, 1993) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC) 
(Entered June 3, 1994) 
DECREE OF ANNULMENT (ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC) 
(Entered June 3, 1994) 
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STATE OP UTAH , _ 
COUNTY OF SAIff XAKEj 
8 8 . 
X, Hal K. Wal ton , do he reby c e r t i f y t h a t I am 
a C e r t i f i e d Shor thand Repor te r o f t h e S t a t e of U t a h ; t h a t on 
A p r i l 19 , 1983 I appeared b e f o r e t h e above-named Court and 
r e p o r t e d in S t eno type t h e Order h e r e i n a t t a c h e d c o n s i s t i n g 
of t e n p a g e s . Tnat t h e sanfe* i s a t r u e and c o r r e c t r e n d i t i o n 
of my shor thandMiotes a s t r a n s c r i b e d by me. 
fc cr£ 
H.M. Walton C.S.R. 
Datedt March 21«t/ 1992 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE„QFrtUTAH OOOOQOOODOOOOOO 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Defendant. 
D-81-4371 
J U D G E ' S O R D E R 
BE IT REMEMBERED, t h a t t h e a b o v e - c a p t i o n e d c a u s e o f 
a c t i o n came on r e g u l a r l y for h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e HONORABLE 
DEAN E". CONDER, one o f t h e Judges o f t h e above-named Court on 
A p r i l 1 9 t h , 1 9 8 3 . 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For t h e P l a i n t i f f s 
For t h e Defendant: 
MR. KENN M.HANSEN 
A t t o r n e y At Law -
740 E. 3900 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Uta& 
MR. HORACE J . KNOWLTON 
A t t o r n e y . At Law 
2 1 4 Tenth Avenue 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a i 
1 THE COURTs It's the Judgement of this Court that 
2 the parties be granted a Decree of Anullment;and I think that] 
3 the law provides that whatever property has been acquired by 
4 the parties during their marriage should be equally divided 
5 between them. And it's my feeling that marriage is a partnei 
6 -shiprand as much as possible should share in the profits an4 
7 share in the losses. 
8 I find that there is an equity in the home of thirty^ 
9 three-thousand-six hundred-thirty dollars* Going to award 
10 the home to the Plaintiff herein. 
11 I find that there is an equity in the Duchesne lot o| 
12 five-hundred-fifty dollars, because that's what you say you 
13 took it in for?and I'll award that to you so that you can 
14 find it and have whatever value there is for that^ 
15 MR. BUGGER: If you can find it. 
16 THE COURT: —in the mobile trailer home, I find 
17 that there is a present value equity of $7000rand going to 
18 award that to the Defendant. Furniture and fixtures I'll 
19 award to the Plaintiff. The siding company, sir, whatever 
20 there was there you say is yours?so you're obligated for 
21 whatever obligations there are arising out of it and I'll 
22 award to you whatever tools of the trade and equipment there 
23 may be that were yours for use rand you're entitled to get 
24 them? if the Plaintiff has any of them, order that she turn 
25 them over to the Defendant, including the tool press, bench 
1 saw, ladder and wheel barrow* 
2 Since apparently neither side is certain that there 
3 is a diamond ring, it's whereabouts, not going to make any 
4 specific order on that unless it's determined where it is. I 
5 don't know where it is. 1975 Cadillac going to award to the 
6 Plaintiff, and as I figure it, that gives to the Plaintiff in 
7 assets, $38,630. 
8 Since the Defendant has%sold the truck, the Plymouth, 
9 LeMans," I'll award him the proceeds of those sales;the thous-
10 -and dollars on the truck, the fifty dollars on the Plymouth,! 
11 fifty dollars on the LeMansrvalue of the tools at $1,700,and 
12 that comes to $10,350, including the mobile home and the Duch 
13 -esne lot. I think that the.obligation on the property of thfe 
j *» .* * 
t4 marriage certainly ought to be shared up until the time the 
15 1 parties split up?and so I am going to order that the payment 
16 to Sears of $432 be split between the parties. Dr. Barnes is 
17 to be split. Don't have a figure on that. 
18 MR. HANSEN: Fifty dollars, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: ' Fifty dollars? All right. The mobil 
20 home, the $1,500 paid by the Plaintiff on that, to be split 
J i 
21 I between the parties. The $744 to be split between the parties 
22 | And the IRS lien, because the only evidence I have before-me 
t 
23 ! is apparently .those were obligations incurred during the marr 
24 | -iage when both of you are working rand I can't identify as 
25 j being the obligation oi one person only. - And so if I add 
1 those figures together, that leaves one item that I 
2 have not included here;I have some difficulty trying to figur^ 
3 out what it is;and that's the equity in the uniform real 
4 estate contract* It has nine years to go, for 12 months, 
5 times $79* which means that there is $8,532 yet to be paid on 
6 that. But that would have to be discounted to it's current 
7 value;in nine years, the interest would equal the principal. 
8 Going to set the figure on that of $6000;just having to do it 
9 arbitrarily* If I put $6000 on that and award that to the 
10 Defendant, the two parties then come out approximately equal. 
11 Nineteen-thousand-thfee-huridred-fifteen dollars to the Plain-
> 
12 -tiff; nineteen-thousand-eight** » dollars to the Defendant. 
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And I think that's as near as I can divide the assets. 
MR. HANSEN: One point of Vitrification, Your 
Honor. And now that I get your bottom figure here;I am assumf 
-ing then that the award of the residence to the Plaintiff 
would incorporate the underlying first and second mortgage 
obligation thereunder. 
THE COURT: I have taken, using $33;630 and value 
of the property and $5000 for the Cadillac, makes a total of 
thiiiy-eight-thousand-six-hundred-thirty dollars. I really 
give no value to furniture and fixtures, because they're 
valuable to tie person that has them, but can't sell them for 
fifty bucks, a hundred bucks, whatever. 
MR. HANSEN: It would be, Your Honor, for my own 
1 c l a r i f i c a t i o n then that the award of the r e a l property, 
2 t h a t ' s the Kearns property to the P l a i n t i f f i s subject t o herj 
3 assuming both underlying o b l i g a t i o n s , 
4 THE COURTs Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t . Cadi l lac , furn i t -
5 -ure and f ix tures in the home would only be §6000. §19,315, 
6 i f I d iv ide that by two, g ive him the Duchesne l o t , mobile 
7 home and t h e t r u c k , and t h e Plymouth, LeMans, t h e t o o l s , u n i -
8 -form r e a l e s t a t e contract and one h a l f the debts that have 
9 been paid by her;and that comes out t o h i s share §19,018. I 
10 think that d i f ference i s too miniscule t o bo ther w i th . 
11 MR. BUGGER: How zm I go i n ' t o c o l l e c t on the 
12 t o o l s when there a i n ' t any? They s o l d 'em a l l . 
13 THE COURT: Sorry, c a n ' t answer tha t ques t ion . 
14 Didn't create t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Doing the b e s t I can with what 
15 I have g o t . 
16 MR KNOWLTON: Your Honor h a s awarded, a s I under 
17 - s tand, the home out at Kearns together with the furniture 
13 there contained, t o the P l a i n t i f f ?and t h a t , as I heard Your 
!9 Honor, was approximately §38,000 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh and the Cad i l l ac . 
21 MR. KNCWLTQN: That would be §43 ,000 . 
22 THE COURT: No, § 3 3 , 6 3 5 f o r t h e home, §5000 f o r 
23 t h e C a d i l l a c makes § 3 8 , 6 3 0 . 
24 MR. KNOWLTCK: My quest ion i s , you sa id §19,000 
25 t o the one;§19,000 t o the other . How can we ge t §38,000 out 
1
 of $19,000 i t seems to me that under Your Honor's r u l e | 
2
 THE COURT: Wait a minute, you^re r i g h t . You're 
3 r i g h t . You're r i g h t . Wait a minute;got t o make another c a l f 
4
 - c u l a t i o n here. You're r i g h t . I now come up with $19,018 
5 that he g e t s . And a s s e t s , she ge t s t h i r t y - e i g h t . So I 've 
6
 got t o subtract the d i f ference between those two. Yes, he h^s 
7
 another $4,311 in equity in the va lue of the home. 
8 What I am doing i s taking $38,630 as the d i s t r i b u t e 
9 - i o n t o Mrs. whatever—the d i s t r i b u t i o n t o the Defendant. I | 
10 come out with $19,018. 
11 MR. KSJOWLTON: Yes, s i r . 
12 THE COURTs And that includes ha l f of the b i l l s 
13 that were incurred af ter the separat ion, except for the mort] 
^*. 
14 -gage payments?! think that inures to her benefit because 
15 she has lived in the home during that time;and so I add thosj 
16 together and I come out with $19,018;and for him. And $38,6JJG 
17 if I subtract the $19,000 from the $38,630, that leaves me 
18 eight-thousand-six-hundred-seventy -two dollars more that 
19 she's getting than he. And if you divide that between them, 
20 that would be $4,311 to him to even out. So they come out 
21 even. You follow me? 
22 MR. KNCWLTON: I don't believe I do, Your Honor. 
23 Thirty-eight-thousand would be the equity that she would be 
24 r e c e i v i n g . 
25 THE COURT: That's r i g h t . 
1 MR. KNOWLTONs And the $19,000 from $38,000 i s 
2 THE COURTs Maybe my f igures are wrong. Didn't 
3 use my ca lcu la tor on that one. I f I don't use my c a l c u l a t o r 
4 I am in trouble . 
5 MR. KNOWLTONs Difference would be 17,000. Half 
6 of 17,000. 
7 THE COURTs 19,652, the difference, so X am in 
8 error. $19,652 difference. Divide that by two and that 
9 means $9,826 equity in the home that the Defendant should 
10 have. 
11 I Now, Mr. Hansen, have you followed my figures, I 
12 hope? 
13 MR.HANSENs Well, Your Honor, I think so. If I 
14 can recap concerning the Plaintiffs pb'sition I have got. 
15 The Defendant's position we have taken $550 equity on the 
16 Duchesne lot. 
17 THE COURTs Give them to you. Duchesne lot, $550,] 
18 mobile home, $7000, truck that was sold, $1000, '48 Plymouth 
19 fifty dollars, '65 LeMans, $50. tools, $l",700r balance on un-j-
20 -iform real estate contract, $6000. Trying to take my best 
21 guestimate of what that would be. 
22 MR. HANSENs 615350. 
23 THE COURTs She has paid in o b l i g a t i o n s the IRS, 
24 $2650, $423 t o somebody—I don't remember who i t i s , $1 ,300, 
25 $744, which comes out t o $5,367 and charge him with ha l f of 
that—is $26 ,83 .50 . So I add t o h i s the 2683. 
2
 I MR. HANSEN: Ok. Come wi th in a few do l lars of 
1 
6 
7 
3
 that that arrives at his equity figure then. 
4
 THE COURT? Ok. 
5
 I MR. HANSEN? From the Plaintiff $38,630, Your 
Honor, that incorporates or encompasses the half of the bills 
she has paid;I assumed, in other words the other 2683 that is 
8
 I in there. 
9
 I THE COURT: Taking the current balance on the 
equity of the place. She has the advantage of living there 
for whatever it is, I considered that comparable to the rent 
1* I -ting of the place during the same period a time. All right. 
*
3
 Now, that means that on this kind of a division she 
10 
I I 
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MR. HANSEN: X don.'t know that^ tha t 
1 4
 J would s t i l l ewe him $9,&l0 as a l i e n on the hoine7> 
1 5
 | MR. KNOWLTCN: To make i t equ i tab le . Your Honor, 
1 6
 I so tha t Your Honor w i l l understand our th inking , I think we 
17
 | would be wi l l ing to offer her the switch and give her $10,000 
*
8
 I from the sale of the home, that is» 
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MR. KNOWItfON: Give her everything that they 've 
of fered her and $10,000 for the s a l e of the home. 
THE COURT: Well , you can work tha t out any way 
you want. But my c a l c u l a t i o n s have gone as far as I can r i g h t 
now. Now, I think that with the res idence and the home t h a t ' s 
there, there ought to be a reasonable period to try to s e l l i t 
or pay the Defendant his equity* How much time do 
you think that would be, Mr.Hansen? 
MR. KNGWLTONs Thirty days. 
THE COURT: Oh no. Spring. Mr. Hansen? 
MR. ffi^NSEN: Your Honor, if I can have just a 
moment to digest a little bit of this and consult with my cli 
-ent, if I may? 
THE COURTS Give you thirty seconds. 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, we would ask the Court 
that under the circumstances that we have,-we're in April,now 
that is the 4th month?that we have 180 days to come up with 
the money to satisfy that lien. 
THE COURT: Mr* Knowlton, what would you suggest? 
MRe KNOWLTONs Your Honor, calling the attention 
of the Court to the fact that this is April, we're about to g 
into May* In our area the selling time is May and October. 
We think, Your Hqnor, sixty days would be just right 
And we think Your Honor should give some thought to whether oip 
not there shouldn't be any 
THE COURT: Ok. Here is what I am going to do. 
I am going to order that the Plaintiff have six months in 
which to sell and pay to the Defendant the $9,826. The reasoji 
I am doing it that way is because I am giving the Defendant 
the income off from the uniform real estate contractrand that 
if it is not sold within six months or the Defendant is paid 
9 
1 out and I donft care whether you sell it or pay him the) 
2 $9,826?that the ammount will then accrue interest at the 
E legal rate, which is now 12 %• And the Court will order the| 
4 property listed for sale byNmultiple listing real estate 
5 ) agency and sold for the best price* And that after that 
6 date, six months fr^^Jie date I sign the Order, on this, it 
7 would accrue interest^at the rate of the legal rate of inter] 
8 -est* Not going to award attorneys fees* Don't think they 
9 are called for under the Anullment Statute* Ok* Good luck 
10 to you, The Court will be in recess. 
H (WHEREUPON„%hi.3 hearing was concluded.) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI. 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTED ^ Z 2 ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
&y» 
WILMA Re BUGGER, 
VS. 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendante 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. D-81-4371 
JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 19th 
day of April, 1983, before the HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, one of the 
Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury; and the 
Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, Kenn M. 
Hansen, and the Defendant appearing in person and with his 
attorney, Horace J. Knowlton; and it having been shown to the Court 
that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of the Complaint and 
a copy of- the Summons, and wherein the Defendant having answered 
same within the allotted time by statute, and the testimony of the 
parties having been heard in open Court, and the Court having been 
fully informed in the premises, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff is now and for more than three (3) 
months last past has been an actual bona fide resident of the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 1 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a purported 
marriage contract on the 10th day of June, 1946, in Las Vegas, 
State of Nevada, and ever since said time have been and now are 
husband and wife. 
3. That at the time Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the 
purported marriage contract, Plaintiff was married to another 
person. That the Plaintiff failed to advise the Defendant that she 
in fact was a married woman at the time of her marriage to the 
Defendant herein. 
4. That the assets of the marriage should be divided as 
follows: 
a. That the Plaintiff should be awarded the home and 
real property located at 4098 West 5500 South in Kearns, Utah, 
and described as follows, to-wit: 
Lot 7 Blk 69 Hoffman Heights No. 11 in the 
City of Kearns, County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, 
together will all household furniture, furnishings and 
effects, plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile. 
b. That the Defendant should be awarded the real 
property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the mobile home; his 
siding company and tools; his truck; and the proceeds from the 
Uniform Real Estate contract. 
c. That the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the 
Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6) 
months after the date of the signing of the Decree of 
Annulment. That after said six (6) months, in the event the 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 2 
Plaintiff fails to pay to the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, 
then the Court shall sell the home and the Defendant be paid 
said $9,862*00, plus interest to accrue at the legal rate of 
12%. 
d. Further that the Defendant should be awarded the 
proceeds from the sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans 
automobiles, which sums are now in Defendant's possession. 
e. That the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the 
Defendant the sum of $1,700.00, as and for the siding tools 
which she sold during said marriage. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff and Defendant be granted a Decree of 
Annulment, same to become final upon the signing and entry. 
2. That the Plaintiff be awarded the following real and 
personal property as her sole and separate property and estate, to-
wit: the home and real property located at 4098 West 5500 South in 
Kearns, Utah, and described as follows, to-wit: 
Lot 7 Blk 69 Hoffman Heights No. 11 in the 
City of Kearns, County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, in Kearns, Utah, 
together will all household furniture, furnishings and effects, 
plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile. 
3. That the Defendant be awarded the following real and 
personal property as his sole and separate property and estate, to-
wit: the real property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the mobile 
home; his siding company and tools; his truck; and the proceeds 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 3 
from the Uniform Real Estate contract, and the proceeds from the 
sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans automobiles, which sums are now 
in Defendant's possession. 
4* Further that the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to 
the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6) 
months after the date of the signing of the Decree of Annulment. 
That after said six (6) months, in the event the Plaintiff fails to 
pay to the Defendant the sura of $9,862.00, then the Court shall 
sell the home and the Defendant be paid said $9,862.00, plus 
interest to accrue at the legal rate of 12%, plus the sum of 
$1,700.00, as and for the siding tools which she sold during said 
marriage. 
DATED this .19th day of April, 1983. 
J O I J T Y COURT CEFU 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. ; 
) AMENDED 
l DECREE OF ANNULMENT 
1 CIVIL NO. D-81-4371 
I JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 19th 
day of April, 1983, before the HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, one of the 
Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury, and the 
Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, Kenn M. 
Hansen, and the Defendant appearing in person and with his 
attorney, Horace J. Knowlton; and it having been shown to the Court 
that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of the Complaint and 
a copy of the Summons, and wherein the Defendant having answered 
same within the allotted time by statute, and the testimony of the 
parties having been heard in open Court, and the Court having been 
fully informed in the premises, hereby makes the following: 
AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT - 1 
O R D E R 
1« That the Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby granted to a 
Decree of Annulment, same to become final upon the signing and 
entry« 
2. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the following real 
and personal property as her sole and separate property and estate, 
to-wit: the home and real property located at 4098 West 5500 South 
in Kearns, Utah, described as follows, to-wit: 
Lot 7 Blk 69 Hoffman Heights No. 11 in the 
City of Kearns, County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, 
together will all household furniture, furnishings and effects, 
plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile. 
3. That the Defendant is hereby awarded the following real 
and personal property as his sole and separate property and estate, 
to-wit: the real property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the 
mobile home; his siding company and tools; his truck; the proceeds 
from the Uniform Real Estate contract; and the proceeds from the 
sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans automobiles, which sums are now 
in Defendant's possession. 
4. Further that the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to 
the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6) 
months after the date of the signing of this Decree of Annulment. 
That after said six (6) months, in the event the Plaintiff fails to 
pay to the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, then the Court shall 
sell the home in Kearns, Utah, described as follows, to-wit: 
AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT - 2 
O R D E R 
1. That the Plaintiff a £ Defendant are hereby granted to a 
Decree of Annulment, same to become f^inal upon the signing and 
entry• 
2e That the.Plaintiff is hereby awarded the following real 
and personal property as her sole and separate property and estate, 
to-wit: the home and real property located in Kearns, Utah, 
together will all household furniture, furnishings and effects, 
plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile. 
3. That the Defendant is hereby awarded the following real 
and personal property as his sole and separate property and estate, 
to-wit: the real property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the 
mobile home; his siding company and tools; his truck; the proceeds 
from the Uniform Real Estate contract; and the proceeds from the 
sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans automobiles, which sums are now 
in Defendant's possession. 
4. That the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to the 
Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6) 
months after the date of the signing of the* Decree of Annulment, 
plus interest to accrue at the legal rate of 12%, and the sum of 
$1,700.00, as and for the siding tools which she sold during said 
marriage. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 1983. 
DECREE OF ANNULMENT - 2 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CHARLES B, BUGGER, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC) 
Case No. D-81-4371 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Commissioner Atherton/Peuler 
oooOooo 
A trial on this matter came on for hearing and resolution on the 19th day of April, 
1983, before the Honorable Dean Conder, District Court Judge presiding. The Plaintiff 
appeared personally and through her attorney, Kenn M. Hanson; the Defendant appeared 
personally and through his attorney, Horace J. Knowlton. The Court heard and considered 
the parties' testimony as proffered by their respective attorneys of record and further 
considered the evidence to be presented, and being fully advised in the premises and good 
cause appearing thereon, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant are now and for at least three (3) months 
immediately before the filing of this action have been residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
( i n t f n 
2. The parties were purportedly married on June 10, 1946, in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. However, at that time of said marriage the Plaintiffs interlocutory period from 
a prior divorce had not yet expired thereby rendering the marriage ceremony to the named 
Defendant in their action as void. 
3. During the course of the parties' relationship, seven (7) children were born 
as issue of the alleged marriage all of whom have attained the age of majority and none 
are in need of any financial support 
4. During the course of their relationship the parties have acquired certain real 
property presently situated at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah, consisting of a house 
and lot. Said real property is titled solely in the name of the Plaintiff. The fair market 
value of said real property is determined to be $47,000.00. 
5. There exists an underlying 1st mortgage on said real property in the amount 
of $5,63331; there also exists an underlying 2nd mortgage on said real property in the 
amount of $8,236.10. 
6. Based thereon, the total present equity in the real property is in the sum of 
$33,630.77. 
7. During the course of the parties's relationship, the parties acquired a cabin 
lot located in Duchesne County, Utah. The fair market value of said real property is 
determined to be $550.00. 
8. During the course of the parties' relationship, the parties acquired a 12' x 60' 
mobile home. The fair market value of said mobile home is determined to be $7,000.00. 
-2-
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9. During their relationship the parties acquired certain motor vehicles 
described as follows with corresponding values determined by the Court: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
Description 
1975 Cadillac automobile 
Mercury automobile 
Panel truck 
1948 Plymouth 
1965 Pontiac 
Value 
$5,000.00 
100.00 
1,000.00 
50.00 
50.00 
10. During the course of the relationship, the parties acquired the proceeds of 
a-Uniform Real Estate Contract on a principal sum of $7,800.00 at 9% interest per annum 
for 15 years paying $79.11 per month. Said contract has 9 years on its terms and the 
present value of said note is $6,000.00 
11. During the course of the relationship, the Defendant has acquired various 
tools of his trade which have a present fair market value of $1,700.00. 
12. During the course of the relationship, the parties incurred various obligations 
set forth below with corresponding approximate balances which have been paid by Plaintiff 
and for which she is entitled to a contribution towards: 
Creditor Balance 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Sears $ 
Dr. Regal 
Mobile Home 
Credit Union 
423.00 
50.00 
1,500.00 
744.00 
-3-
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e. IRS lien 2,650.00 
13. During the course of the relationship, the Defendant incurred certain debts 
in the name of his business, B&B Siding, some of which are as follows: 
a. Century Finance Company; 
b. Valley Bank & Trust; 
c- VISA; and 
& Texaco. 
14. It is fair and reasonable that the real property located at 4098 West 5500 
South, Kearns, Utah, be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff assuming and paying 
the underlying 1st and 2nd mortgages thereon, and, further, subject to an equitable hen 
in favor of Defendant in the amount of $9,796.00. 
15. It is fair and reasonable that the Plaintiff pay to Defendant the amount of 
an equitable lien as follows: 
a. Plaintiff shall have 180 days from entry of the Decree to pay to Defendant 
the amount of $9,796.00. 
b. In the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant $9,796.00 upon the expiration 
of 180 days from the entry of the Decree, said amount of Defendant's lien shall 
accrue interest on the principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
c. Further, upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the Decree and 
in the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant the amount of Defendant's hen, the 
above-referenced real property shall be listed for sale through a multiple listing 
agency and sold for the best price. 
-4-
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16. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded as his sole and separate 
property the cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah, subject to any and all underlying 
obUgations thereon0 
17. It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the 12s x 60' mobile home subject to any and all underlying obligations 
thereon. 
18. It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the proceeds of a Uniform Real Estate contract amounting to $79.11 per 
month until said payments terminate according to the terms and provisions of said 
contract. 
19. It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the fixtures, furniture and personal property located within the real property at 
4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah. 
20. It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be ordered to assume and pay, 
holding the Plaintiff harmless from any liability thereon, the debts and obUgations arising 
from the Defendant's company known as B&B Siding Co., some of which are listed as 
foUows: 
a. Century Finance 
b. VaUey Bank & Trust 
c. VISA 
d. Texaco 
-5-
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21. It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the proceeds from the sale of the following automobiles: 
a* The B&B Siding panel truck 
b. 1948 Plymouth automobile 
c. 1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile 
d. the Mercury automobile. 
22. It is fair and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and 
separate property the 1975 Cadillac automobile. 
23. It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the tools of his trade that remain in Plaintiffs possession. 
24. It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be ordered to pay and assume 
one-half of the bills owing to: 
a. Sears 
b. Dr. Regal 
c. payments on the mobile home 
d. personal loan 
e. IRS lien 
25. It is fair and reasonable that each party be ordered to assume and pay their 
respective attorney's fees and costs in maintaining this action. 
WHEREFORE, the Court, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of 
Fact, now makes and enters the following: 
-6-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to this case and the 
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this type of action. 
2. There exists grounds legally sufficient to grant a Decree of Annulment 
declaring said marriage between the parties to be void ab initio. 
3. There exists legally insufficient grounds to award any attorney's fees to either 
party and each should bear their own costs and expenses in this matter, 
4. The Decree of Annulment should be in conformance with the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. 
5. Pursuant to the trial held on April 19, 1994, the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the Court are sjitered NUNC PRO TUNC. 
3 
DATED this _ day of 
Approved as to Form: 
David Brown 
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HOME: 
Fair Market Value 
1st mortgage: $5,633.13 
2nd mortgage: $8,236.00 
TOTAL EQUITY: 
PLAINTIFFS EQUITY: 
a. Real Property 
b. Cadillac 
Plaintiffs GROSS equity: 
LESS Defendant's lien: 
PLAINTIFFS NET EQUITY: 
DEFENDANTS EQUITY: 
a. Duchesne property 
b. UREC 
c. Trailer 
d. l /2 of debts 
e. Defendant's tools 
g. Car proceeds 
Defendant's GROSS equity: 
PLUS Defendant's lien: 
$47,500.00 
-13.869.23 
$33.630.77 
$33,630.00 
5.000.00 
38,630.00 
9,796.00 
mmm 
$ 550.00 
6,000.00 
7,000.00 
2,688.00 
1,700.00 
UQQ.OQ 
$19,038.00 
9.796.00 
DEFENDANTS TOTAL EOUITY$28.834.00 
COMPUTATION OF DEFENDANTS LIEN: 
Plaintiffs GROSS equity: $38,630.00 
Less Defendant's GROSS equity: -19.038.00 
Difference $19.592.00 
$19,592.00 divided by 2 = $9,796.00 (Defendant's lien) 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
the following: 
David Brown, Esq. 
#9 Exchange Place #1120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this 10th day of May, 1994. 
BUGG-CON.LAW " 
-9-
C01?-6 
W. KEVIN JACKSON (1640) 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379 
Telephones (801) 531-6600 
Faxs (801) 521-3731 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs6 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF ANNULMENT 
(ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC) 
Case No. D-81-4371 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Commissioner Atherton/Peuler 
oooOooo 
A trial on this matter came on for hearing and resolution on 
the 19th day of April, 1983, before the Honorable Dean Conder, 
District Court Judge. Plaintiff appeared personally and through 
her attorney, Kenn M. Hanson; the Defendant appeared personally 
and through his attorney, Horace J. Knowlton. The Court heard and 
considered the parties' testimony as proffered by their respective 
attorneys and further considered the evidence to be presented, and 
being fully advised in the premise sand good cause appearing 
thereon, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Annulment 
declaring the parties marriage void ab initio and of no legal 
force or effect. 
2. The real property located at 4098 West 5500 South, 
Kearns, Utah, is hereby awarded to Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff 
assuming and paying the underlying 1st and 2nd mortgages thereon, 
and, further, subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendant 
in the amount of $9,796*00 and which shall be extinguished by the 
Court's ruling on the Defendant's Order to Show Cause and the 
trial on the same held on April 19, 1994. 
3e The Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant the amount of the 
equitable lien as follows? 
a- The Plaintiff shall have 180 days from entry of the 
Decree of Annulment to pay to Defendant the amount of 
$9,796cQ0. 
b* In the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant $9,796.00 
upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the Decree, 
said amount of Defendant's lien shall accrue interest on the 
principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid, 
c* Further, upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry 
of the Decree and in the event Plaintiff has not paid 
Defendant the amount of Defendant's lien, the above-
referenced real property shall be listed for sale through a 
multiple listing agency and sold for the best price. 
4. The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property the cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah, subject 
to any and all underlying obligations thereon. 
5. The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property the 12' x 60' mobile home subject to any and all 
underlying obligations thereon. 
6. The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property the proceeds of a Uniform Real Estate Contract amounting 
-2-
to $79.11 per month until said payments terminate according to the 
terms and provisions of said contract. 
7 c The Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property the fixtures, furniture and personally located within the 
real property at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah. 
8. The Defendant is hereby ordered to assume and pay, 
holding the Plaintiff harmless from any liability thereon, all of 
the debts and obligations arising from the Defendant's company 
known as B&B Siding• 
9. The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property the proceeds from the sale of the following automobiles: 
a. The B&B Siding panel truck 
b. 1948 Plymouth automobile 
c. 1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile 
do the Mercury automobile. 
10. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property the 1975 Cadillac automobile. 
11. The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property the tools of his trade that remain in Plaintiff's 
possession. 
12. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay and assume one-
half of the bills owing to: 
a. Sears 
b. Dr. Regal 
c. payments on the mobile home 
d. personal loan 
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e. The IRS lien obligation 
13. Each party is ordered to assume and pay their respective 
attorney's fees and costs in maintaining this action. 
14 c Pursuant to the hearing and trial conducted by the Court 
on April 19, 1994, the above orders and decrees are hereby entered 
and shall be deemed effective from the 19th day of April, 1983 and 
they are hereby entered NUNC PRO TUNC. 
DATED this _ day of , 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE TYRONE MEDLEY 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
AVID BROWN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to the following: 
David Brown, Esq-
#9 Exchange Place #1120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by placiner the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
this irr& day of MOM 199^. 
BOGG-DBC.AMX. 
h 
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